Many courts hate the doctrine of a Tiebreaker, which should only be used as a last resort. Schering Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., 712 F.2d 4, 10 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (“counter preferentem is only used as a last resort, after all construction aids have been put in place but have not eliminated ambiguities … [t]o to the conclusion that any policy expressed in an ambiguous manner should be automatically interpreted against the insurer”); United States Fire Insurance Co. vs. General Reinsurance Corp. 949 F.2d 569, 573-74 (2d Cir.1991) (following the evolution of the counter-prof rule and the remark that New York law is increasingly reluctant to apply the rule, except “as a last resort after all construction aids have been used but have not eliminated ambiguities” and the remark that the rule should not be applied if the contract between two insurers and, more generally, is inappropriate, if both are not moved, the parts are sophisticated) (internal quotes are omitted). In some states, doctrine is a more critical element of the analytical framework of contract construction. In Iowa, for example, the contra proferentem system is not seen as a “Tiebreaker,” but as a strong rule that ambiguous language must be “interpreted rigorously against the cartoonist.” Shelby County State Bank v.

Van Diest Supply Co., 303 F.3d 832, 838 (7 cir. 2002) (non-insurance case). Similarly, in Delaware, ambiguities are interpreted in an insurance policy against the insurer, without verifying the actual intent of the parties, since an “insurance contract is a detention contract.” New Castle, 243 F.3d to 750 (quote omitted). Most people are familiar with the legal rule that requires an interpretation of the treaty against the author. In general, this rule requires, in the event of application, that any ambiguity or other contractual rule subject to several reasonable interpretations be interpreted against the party who wrote the document. On a practical level, the person who “caused the uncertainty” is the person who designed the agreement. The general rule, therefore, is that ambiguities in the drafting of contracts are interpreted against the author. Sands v.

E.I.C., Inc., 118 Cal.App.3d 231 (1981). However, the application of the doctrine is not appropriate if the insured is a demanding unit with significant bargaining power. Large companies generally have a risk management department and are often represented by brokers who provide insurance expertise and their own bargaining power. This is why courts often apply an exception to the doctrine of “sophisticated insureds.” See Christopher R. Parr and Elizabeth V. Kniffen, “The Underwriter`s Role Against Contra Proferentem,” Insurance Act360, January 11, 2012. These courts do not understand ambiguity with respect to both parties when the policy is negotiated by highly developed parties. Westowne Shoes Inc.

v. City Insurance Co., 82 F.3d 420 (Table), (7. Cir. 1996) (the insured`s status as a highly developed businessman has rendered him at least equal [to the insurer], rendering the justification of the doctrine of the contra-preferentem unenforceable”); Schering, 712 F.2d at 10 n.2 (“a number of courts have recognized that, in cases where they are negotiated contracts negotiated by demanding parties, the underlying liability contract for the doctrine is unansited”); Catlin Specialty Insurance Co. v. QA3 Financial Corp., 36 F. Supp.3d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [c]ontra proferentem does not apply when contracts are negotiated by advanced parties of the same bargaining power”); RTG Furniture Corp.

v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 616 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266 n.6 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (contra proferentem” only applies if the insurance is written by the insurer”); Vought Aircraft Industries Inc. v. Falvey Cargo Underwriting LTD., 729 F.

Supp. 2d 814, 824 (N.D. Tex. 2010).